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Abstract: We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an 
exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to 
corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders 
held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise 
controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR 
strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent 
management. Our findings support the view that economic incentives are important to promote 
corporate governance and deter fraud. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory, which suggests a need for shareholders to monitor managers against 
opportunistic behaviors detrimental to firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1989), has been widely applied to rationalize studies of managerial behavior and corporate 
governance (Dalton et al., 2007). The primary critique against agency theory is that there is 
weak empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of policing mechanisms that seek to mitigate 
agency costs (Tosi et al., 2000; Dalton et al., 2007).
1
 For instance, empirical studies highlight 
the lack of efficient executive contracting (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), the scarcity of 
relative performance evaluation of CEOs (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999), and the weak power of 
shareholders in selecting directors (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). A recognized limitation of the 
agency theory is that it is too general to account for the diversity of institutional contexts in 
which empirical studies are based (Bruce et al., 2005). As a result, institutional-related theories 
may contribute to the development of principal-agency models that incorporate contextual 
influences and operationalize constructs within agency theory (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005). 
Institutional theory suggests that organizations conform to legitimacy imperatives due to 
state pressures, expectations of the profession, or collective norms of the environment (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). Such conformity could lead to passive acquiescence that does not 
contribute to the organizations’ interest and efficiency (Tolbert, 1985; Zucker, 1977). There are 
two offsetting effects that could influence firms’ strategic responses to institutional processes. 
The first is institutional change, which occurs as a result of organizations’ responses to 
contingency shifts following internal or external events (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 
1992). Such changes may arise either through the evolutionary process within an organization, 
or through a centralized process mandated across organizations (Kingston and Caballero, 
                                                 
1
 As a result, alternative perspectives have been put forward in the literature, including the executive power theory 
(Finkelstein, 1992), stakeholder theory (Mitchell et al., 1997), and the stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997). 
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2009). The second effect is institutional inertia, which causes organizations to resist 
innovations because they do not perceive a net benefit (Ruttan, 2006), or because of the linkage 
and complementarities between organizations within the same domain (Aoki, 2006). In other 
words, firms’ corporate governance practices may be determined by conformity to 
environmental constraints. While centrally mandated governance reforms may invoke 
institutional changes, the impact may not occur uniformly across all firms due to variations in 
institutional inertia. 
In this paper, we utilize an exogenous reform event in China and draw upon agency- and 
institutional-related theories to examine what effect controlling shareholders exhibit on the 
accountability of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to corporate fraud behavior. Regulatory 
reforms in China’s transition from a centrally planned to market-oriented economy provide a 
natural experiment setting (Meyer, 1995) for empirically testing academic theories. We exploit 
the 2005 Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) in China to observe how institutional change 
influences principals’ motivation in dealing with agency problems. We find evidence that this 
reform generates the required incentives for controlling shareholders in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to strengthen CEO accountability against opportunistic behavior 
detrimental to firm value. We contribute to the strategic management and business ethics 
literature by demonstrating the importance of economic incentives in promoting corporate 
fraud deterrence in a prominent transitional economy. 
Since China is an increasingly influential emerging country, its development experience 
offers useful implications for other aspiring economies. Although China’s growth is impressive, 
its rapidly changing economic environment also creates a fertile ground for managerial 
opportunism underlying corporate fraud. Widespread corporate fraud could hamper China’s 
economic aspirations since such corporate fraud negatively affects the confidence of 
stakeholders (Davidson and Worrell, 1988), the job security of employees (Zahra et al., 2005), 
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and the well being of the entire society (Szwajkowski, 1985). Existing studies suggest that top 
management is important antecedent of corporate fraud (Daboub et al., 1995; Donoher et al., 
2007) and is often held accountable (Karpoff et al., 2008; Person, 2006) for such behavior. 
However, the association between corporate fraud and managerial accountability in China has 
not been well examined. While existing studies of corporate fraud in China (Chen et al., 2006; 
Jia et al., 2009) largely focus on the influence of corporate governance, previous studies on 
Chinese CEO turnover mainly investigate the link with firm performance (Conyon and He, 
2012; Firth et al., 2006b; Kato and Long, 2006a, 2006b; Shen and Lin, 2009). A common 
problem with studying corporate fraud and corporate governance is that they could be 
endogenously related. Therefore, exogenously induced changes due to regulatory reforms offer 
better research settings for such research questions. A common limitation of studying the 
relation between CEO turnover and performance in China is that a large number of firms (i.e., 
SOEs), have social and political agenda other than profit motives. Therefore, evaluating CEO 
turnover following corporate fraud provides a better test of managerial accountability. 
The Chinese government maintains control of a large proportion of listed firms through 
ownership. Chinese SOE listed firms have three main features. First, they have access to 
government financial support and business contracts, which renders them less dependent on 
external funding provided by the capital market (Chen et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011). In return, 
these firms are expected to promote the government’s socio-political objectives, which could 
obligate them to deviate from the pursuit of increasing their value in capital market (Allen et al., 
2005). Second, their managerial appointment is also influenced by the government (Hassard et 
al., 1999), reducing the accountability of managers to outside investors. This dynamic in SOE 
firms increases the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
acting against the interest of minority shareholders (Fan et al., 2007). Third, to strengthen 
government control of listed firms, China also has imposed a split share structure since the 
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inception of its stock market in early 1990s, and was only gradually eliminated following the 
enactment of the SSSR. Under this approach, state shareholders hold restricted shares that 
cannot be traded freely in the stock market, as can shares held by private shareholders. 
The split share structure inevitably creates a misalignment of interest between state and 
private shareholders, which has negative implications for corporate governance. Unlike the 
private shareholders that hold tradable shares, state shareholders are deprived of the wealth 
implication of share price movement in the stock market. As a result, the state shareholders are 
more interested in pursuing either accounting-based performance targets or political objectives 
(Firth et al., 2006), which are not necessarily helpful in maximizing the long-run market value 
of the firms. Thus, the split share structure renders state shareholders reluctant to ensure 
managers maximize the market value of their firms or to monitor managers against 
opportunistic behavior detrimental to firm value. The SSSR that began in 2005 gradually 
abolished the trading restriction of state shareholders, and has the potential to invoke 
institutional changes to improve corporate governance, particularly among the SOE listed 
firms controlled by state shareholders. 
The aforementioned theoretical rationale and institutional setting suggest that agency 
problems are expected to be dealt with less effectively among Chinese SOE listed firms and 
that the SSSR may contribute to the reduction of this problem. We can therefore make the 
following testable predictions regarding managerial accountability following corporate fraud. 
First, we can predict that the likelihood of CEO turnover following regulatory enforcement 
action against corporate fraud is lower among the SOE listed firms than their non-SOE 
counterparts. This is consistent with the institutional theory in the sense that the governance 
practice adopted by SOE listed firms may be sub-optimal as a result of conforming to state 
pressure than market forces. Second, following the SSSR, the likelihood of CEO turnover 
following enforcement actions should increase more among SOEs than non-SOEs. This is 
 5 
consistent with institutional changes seeking to improve corporate governance being more 
effective when stakeholders are provided with greater economic incentive. Third, if the SSSR 
indeed increases CEO turnover likelihood following enforcement actions among SOEs, this 
effect should also be more pronounced among SOEs that are more receptive and proactive in 
implementing the reform process. This is consistent with cross-sectional variations in 
firm-specific institutional inertia affecting the impact of innovations. Using a sample drawn 
from Chinese listed firms over the period of 1999 to 2008, we find empirical evidence 
consistent with our three predictions. The data include 409 cases of regulatory enforcements 
actions against corporate fraud, each matched with comparable firms by year, industry, and size. 
Our findings contribute to the literature on corporate governance and emerging market 
development by providing the following implications. First, although agency theory predicts 
that the principal would monitor agents against opportunistic behavior, we show that the 
economic incentive of the principal is a crucial prerequisite for this relation to hold. While 
existing corporate governance literature largely focuses on how agents can be incentivized to 
pursue the interest of the principal, we provide an example from a natural experiment that 
shows motivating the principal also matters. This may be achieved either by increasing the 
benefits of monitoring, which we demonstrate in our context, or by reducing the cost of 
monitoring, which can occur if the enactment of regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the U.S. effectively reduces information asymmetry. Second, we show that as China evolves 
from a centrally planned to market-oriented economy, there is a need for institutional reforms 
at a matching pace to strengthen corporate governance. Our findings imply that the split share 
structure has impeded corporate governance especially among SOE listed firms during the 
period in which it was imposed. For China to fully realize the potential of its economic growth 
opportunities, institutional changes, such as those introduced by the SSSR, should be 
accelerated. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Theoretical background 
Agency theory is predicated on the assumption that shareholders and managers seek to 
maximize their own welfare in different ways (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Davis et al., 1997). The 
agency problem occurs when shareholders cannot effectively monitor managers against 
opportunism and expropriation (Eisenhardt, 1989). The extant literature provides no shortage 
of evidence to show that managers prioritize their own interests above that of the shareholders. 
For instance, managers try to report their performance more favorably (Holthausen and 
Leftwich, 1983), make investment decisions at the expense of shareholders (Jarrell et al., 1988; 
Morck et al., 1989), and attempt to insulate themselves from internal (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1980; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989) and external (Dann and DeAngelo, 1983) governance 
mechanisms. Agency costs borne by the shareholders include expenditures to monitor and 
align incentives of manager, as well as the residual loss of firm value that arises from conflicts 
of interest with managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There are three main mechanisms for 
minimizing this residual loss of firm value: external market for corporate control, incentive 
alignment through executive remuneration, and monitoring by a board of directors (Dalton et 
al., 2007). Since shareholders are the legal owner and residual claimants of a firm, the 
shareholder primacy model of corporate governance (Bebchuk, 2006) stipulates that the board 
of directors has a responsibility to protect shareholder interests above all other groups of 
stakeholders. According to this view, the most important duties of the board of directors are to 
represent shareholders in carrying out corporate governance mechanisms such as reporting, 
auditing, and policies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). While empirical studies support a positive 
relationship between shareholders’ influence over the board of directors and firm value 
(Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Campbell et al., 2012), further evidence on the causal nature of 
this relationship in natural experiment setting is warranted. 
 7 
CEO dismissal is one of the most important powers that the board of directors, as the 
representative of shareholders, has to curb the agency problem (Weisbach, 1988; Zald, 1969). 
The negative relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance is well established in 
the literature (Denis and Kruse, 2000; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003). However, the board’s 
decision to dismiss a CEO for poor performance can be affected by many socio-political 
factors. These include the degree to which the board’s allegiance is to shareholders (Allen and 
Panian, 1982), the power of the board relative to the CEO (Ocasio, 1994; Zhang, 2006), and 
expectations of board members, such as beliefs of what constitutes good performance, 
awareness of other firms’ performance levels, and attribution regarding managerial ability to 
change firm performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Performance expectations are also 
complicated by the existence of information asymmetry between the board and CEO (Zajac, 
1990), as well as organizational and environmental factors beyond managerial control 
(Holmstrom, 1982). Positive accounting theory (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983) suggests that 
managerial incentives to manipulate financial statements undermine the credibility of 
accounting-based performance targets. Behavioral finance theory (Hirshleifer, 2002) implies 
that stock returns may be influenced by investor sentiment and rendered less reliable as a 
criterion for judging CEO performance. As a result of these uncertainties, it is easier for the 
board to base CEO dismissal decisions on more observable and legitimate indicators of CEO 
performance (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011). If this is the case, then we expect explicit cases of 
CEO wrongdoings such as corporate fraud, which is based on investigations by regulatory 
authorities, to play an important role in formulating the board’s CEO dismissal decision. 
Corporate fraud is a leading symptom of agency problems, and its influence on CEO 
dismissal is well-documented in studies of the U.S. market (e.g., Karpoff et al., 2008; Person, 
2006). Corporate fraud reduces investor confidence and shareholder wealth, which in turn 
leads to misallocation of capital and instability in the financial market (Karpoff, et al., 1999; 
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Murphy et al., 2009). The literature identifies top management as one of the key antecedents of 
corporate fraud (Baucus, 1994; Efendi et al., 2007; Khanna et al., 2012).
2
 Black (2005) 
classifies fraud into reactive and opportunistic types. The former occurs when executives 
respond to declining firm performance by window dressing financial statements. The latter 
occurs when executives seize an opportunity for further gain by manipulating disclosures. Over 
the past decade, high-profile fraud cases such as Enron, WorldCom, AIG, and Lehman Brothers 
continue to emerge. Schnatterly (2003) suggest that traditional corporate governance 
mechanisms such as blockholders, boards, and CEO compensation have only a limited effect 
on reducing corporate fraud. Berenson (2003) suggests that despite decades of continued 
efforts to reform corporate governance, to align managers’ incentives with shareholders’ 
interest, and to impose codes of conduct for managerial ethics, corporate fraud remains 
prevalent even in the well-developed economy of the U.S. Ferrell and Ferrell (2011) argue that 
this is at least partly a result of a corporate institutional environment where individuals are 
justified or even rewarded for carrying out potentially unethical activities in support of 
personal or organizational gains. This leads to a debate over whether externally legislated 
business ethics, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Beggs and Dean, 2007), or the 
internal corporate ethical culture (Maignan and Ferrell, 2004; Sims and Brinkmann, 2003) is 
more effective in bringing about the institutional changes needed to reduce the underlying 
incentives of corporate fraud. 
An institutional perspective may compliment agency theory in helping to explain 
empirical evidence of managerial behavior by recognizing contextual influences and 
identifying key constructs in the principal-agent relationship (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005). 
Institutions are defined as a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together 
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 Other factors include industry culture (Baucus and Near, 1991), industry concentration (McKendall and Wanger, 
1997), environmental hostility (Baucus and Baucus, 1997), environmental dynamism (Baucus and Near, 1991; 
Wang et al., 2010), regulatory pressures (Szwajkowski, 1985), board composition (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), 
and organization culture (McKendall and Wanger, 1997). 
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generate a regularity of social behavior (Greif, 2006). Institutional theory traditionally focuses 
on legitimizing the process and tendency for organizational practices to be taken for granted 
and imitated by other organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). It suggests that organizational 
behavior is less driven by market forces or efficiency concerns, and more by conformity to 
state, societal, and culture pressures, as well as legacy and tradition (Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983). Compliance with institutional norms and requirements generates rewards such 
as stability, legitimacy, and access to resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In the context of 
corporate governance, firms may not necessarily adopt best practices due to the need to 
conform to external constituents. 
Institutional changes, or deinstitutionalization, refer to the weakening or transformation 
of existing corporate practices, and their substitution by new approaches (Ansari et al., 2010; 
Chung and Beamish, 2005; Sherer and Lee, 2002). Oliver (1992) suggests three possible 
reasons for institutional changes: economic, social, and political pressures. Economic pressure 
stems from changes such as increased competition or reduced rewards for sustaining current 
practices. Social pressure results from changes in organizational structure and the external 
environment. Political pressure arises from shifts in the underlying distribution of power, 
conflicting internal interests, and changes in dependency patterns. In the context of corporate 
governance, externally mandated reforms may change the governance practices of firms if they 
alter the economic pressures to which firms or their stakeholders are exposed.  
Institutional inertia, or resistance to changes, causes the adoption of new practices to be 
symbolic or adapted when it is not compatible with the organization (Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 
2001). Institutional inertia tends to increase with an organization’s age, size, and complexity 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984), and can be strengthened by the existence of strategic linkages 
and complementarities across organizations (Aoki, 2001). The stability of institutions can also 
be self-reinforcing because it influence and align people’s beliefs, behavior, and preferences, 
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which in turn also legitimizes the norms and practices of institutions (Hodgson, 2004). Ruttan 
(2006) argues that institutional innovation requires mobilization of political resources and that 
institutional inertia is likely to persist as long as the expected return does not exceed the 
marginal cost of mobilizing these resources. In the context of corporate governance, 
firm-specific institutional inertia could moderate the effectiveness of externally mandated 
reforms in addressing agency problems. 
Institutional settings 
Fraudulent corporate behavior common among Chinese listed firms ranges from 
delaying disclosure, to providing false statement, to embezzlement (Chen et al., 2005). In 
China, corporate fraud is frequently motivated by two general factors. First, it can be 
stimulated by regulatory pressure and financial needs. For instance, listing is only allowed after 
two consecutive years of profit (Aharony et al., 2000). Similarly, issuing more shares is only 
allowed if a firm’s return on equity is above 10% for three continuous years (Chen and Yuan, 
2004), while delisting occurs after three consecutive years of losses (Jiang and Wang, 2008). 
While these rules are intended as a way to guide capital toward well-performing firms, it also 
generates incentives for listed firms to instigate fraud in order to meet the requirements. Second, 
corporate fraud may be more common in a dynamic and rapidly evolving environment (Baucus 
and Near, 1991). For instance, under weak legal enforcement and investor protection (Allen et 
al., 2005; Morck et al., 2000), managers are more likely to believe that they can exploit 
changing rules and get away with fraud. 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) serves as the main regulator of 
securities markets in China and is modeled after the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the U.S. Part of the responsibility of CSRC is to oversee the securities markets, 
investigating and disciplining fraudulent corporate behavior. The basic regulations against 
corporate fraud include: Provisional Regulations Against Securities Frauds, Temporary Rules 
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for Stock Issuance and Stock Exchanges Regulation, Solutions for Prohibiting Securities Fraud 
and Solutions for Listed Firm Checks. The CSRC carries out this duty through regular reviews 
and regular inspections of firms (Hou and Moore, 2010). It also responds to information and 
complaints of fraud allegations from investors, employees, and media. If misconduct is 
confirmed, the CSRC’s enforcement actions could range from internal and public criticism to 
criminal prosecution. The CSRC has been criticized for being ineffective in identifying and 
prosecuting fraud (Anderson, 2000). Political pressures may affect the power of the CSRC, 
since it is a ministry-level commission that answers to the state (Chen et al., 2005; Liebman and 
Milhaupt, 2008). 
 Chinese-style capitalism is characterized by a high degree of state control of listed firms 
(Bai et al., 2000; Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011) and this distinguishes China from other 
ex-communist transitional economies. Despite three decades of transition from a centrally 
planned to market-oriented economy, the Chinese government (at both the central and local 
level) still maintains control of a majority of the listed firms through state shareholders 
represented by government agencies and other SOEs. This reflects the prevailing 
socio-political ideology of China. On the one hand, the government wants to transform listed 
firms into modern enterprises that are capable of raising their own capital in the market. On the 
other hand, the government wishes to retain influence over listed firms to forward a political 
and social agenda, such as regional development and maintenance of job security. The 
government not only controls SOE listed firms through ownership, but also influences 
managerial appointment (Hassard et al., 1999). In return, the government provides the listed 
firms it controls with financial support through subsidies (Allen et al., 2005) and favorable 
loans (Chen et al., 2011a). 
Since the establishment of its stock exchanges in early 1990s, China has also imposed 
what is known as the split share structure to maintain government control of listed firms. Under 
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this approach, state shareholders held restricted shares while outside private shareholders held 
tradable shares. Restricted shares are not freely tradable on the stock exchange and can only be 
transferred privately or auctioned, usually at a discounted value relative to the firm’s freely 
tradable shares (Chen and Xiong, 2001; Huang and Xu, 2009). The central and local 
governments hold restricted shares through their asset management agencies or affiliated SOEs. 
However, existing studies suggests that the maintenance of Chinese state ownership through 
the split share structure may contribute to a reduction in the corporate governance quality and 
performance efficiency of SOE listed firms (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005). Since 
controlling state shareholders hold restricted shares that are not tradable, their wealth is less 
directly linked to stock returns. Thus, controlling shareholders of such firms have less 
pronounced incentive to monitor managers and ensure that they maximize firms’ market value. 
For instance, existing studies show that CEO compensation (Firth et al., 2006a, 2007) and 
turnover (Conyon and He, 2012) in Chinese SOE listed firms are less sensitive to stock return 
performance relative to non-SOE listed firms. 
Aware of the drawback of the split share structure, the CSRC announced on April 29
th
, 
2005 its decisions to gradually abolish the trading restriction on state shareholders. Official 
guidelines containing formal operational procedures were issued on September 12
th
, 2005. An 
initial pilot of two batches of firms were selected on May 9
th
 and June 19
th
, 2005. All remaining 
listed firms began the reform process in later batches. To prevent an adverse market response, 
which had occurred in the previous reform attempt (Kim et al., 2003), the reform process began 
with negotiations between restricted and tradable shareholders to determine satisfactory level 
of consideration to be paid out to the latter group (Firth et al., 2010). Upon the completion of 
the negotiation process, the portion of restricted shares paid out as a consideration to the private 
investors became immediately tradable. Twelve months later, shareholders who possess less 
than 5% of the firm’s total share value can trade any of their restricted shares in the stock 
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market. Larger shareholders are allowed to trade up to 5% and 10% of their restricted shares 12 
and 24 months after this date, respectively. Finally, 36 months after the negotiation is 
completed, all restricted shares become fully tradable in the stock market. Since all Chinese 
listed firms complete their negotiations by the end of 2008, all restricted shares became fully 
tradable by the end of 2011. The SSSR gave state shareholders the previously unavailable 
option to trade their shares on the stock market. Apart from the shares paid out as consideration 
to private shareholders as a result of the negotiation, this reform does not force state 
shareholders to sell their shares in the secondary market. 
 The SSSR is a significant step in China’s evolution from centrally-planned to 
market-oriented economy. There is increasing interest in the academic literature to explore this 
topic. For instance, Liao et al. (2014) provide evidence of increased output, profits, and 
employment among SOEs following the reform, especially if there are greater incentives of 
increasing state-owned share value. Chen et al. (2012) find evidence consistent with less free 
cash flow problem among firms after the reform, and the effect is more pronounced for those 
with weaker governance. Hou et al. (2012) analyze price synchronicity and show evidence 
consistent with increased firm-specific disclosure among SOEs subsequent to the reform. In 
terms of the reform negotiation process, existing studies show that risk sharing incentives (Li et 
al., 2011) and mutual fund ownership (Firth et al., 2010).  
Hypotheses development 
The Chinese institutional setting affords a unique natural experiment to test our 
theoretical hypotheses in an exogenous context. Agency theory stipulates that residual loss of 
firm value arises due to conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The board of directors is one of the main governance mechanisms to address 
agency problems (Dalton et al., 2007), and CEO dismissal is one of the main tools at their 
disposal (Weisbach, 1988). Dismissal decisions can be complicated by factors such as 
 14 
information asymmetry between the board and CEO (Zajac, 1990), and corporate fraud 
identified by external regulatory authorities provides board of directors with a more legitimate 
cause to discipline their CEO. Nevertheless, institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) 
suggests that conformity to external pressures, which helps generate stability and access to 
resources (DiMaggio, 1988), could cause firms to adopt practices that do not contribute to firm 
efficiency (Tolbert, 1985). Although institutional change could be invoked centrally across 
organizations (Kingston and Caballero, 2009), and by creating economic incentives (Oliver, 
1993), resistance to innovation due to institutional inertia could also occur if the perceived 
benefit does not exceed the cost of adopting new practices (Ruttan, 2006). These institutional 
effects could influence managerial accountability for corporate fraud in China. 
In the context of Chinese SOE listed firms, state financial support and political influence 
over managerial appointment are expected to affect the way in which such firms address 
agency problems. Financial assistance from the government decreases SOE listed firms’ 
dependence on the capital market for external funding (Chen et al., 2011), which in turn 
reduces the concern of such firms over how their behavior affects the market value. Therefore, 
when corporate fraud is uncovered by the regulatory authority, the market value decline that 
ensues may not affect SOE listed firms as much as their non-SOE counterparts. Government 
involvement in managerial appointment increases the likelihood of an entrenchment effect 
(Fan et al., 2007), which in turn reduces the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. 
As a result of both effects, the board of directors in SOE listed firms might be more reluctant to 
hold their CEOs accountable after corporate fraud behavior has been identified. Consistent 
with institutional theory, Chinese SOE listed firms’ willingness to conform to state pressure is 
motivated by financial assistance and political support, and this compliance could determine 
their corporate governance practices more than market forces. This institutional perspective 
contextualizes the effect that state control has on the way Chinese listed firms address agency 
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problems. Therefore, the intersection of agency- and institutional-related theories leads us to 
formulate the first testable hypothesis: 
H1: The likelihood of CEO turnover following corporate fraud enforcement actions is 
lower among SOE than among non-SOE listed firms. 
To maintain state ownership and control of listed firms, China also imposed the split 
share structure until it was gradually abolished by the SSSR beginning in 2005. The split share 
structure gave Chinese state shareholders no ability to trade their shares, insulating them from 
the wealth implications of their firm’s stock market performance. This renders residual loss of 
firm value due to agency problems less costly to state shareholders than to private shareholders. 
Because they bear lower agency costs, state shareholders also have less incentive than private 
shareholders to monitor managers and ensure that they maximize or maintain the firm’s value 
in the stock market. Following the SSSR, state shareholders have the option to trade their 
shares, and their wealth becomes more sensitive to the stock market value of their firms. This 
exposes state shareholders to greater agency costs incurred by residual loss of firm value, 
thereby giving state shareholders an economic motive to monitor and ensure managers 
maximize and maintain firm value in the stock market. To adapt to the new demand of 
controlling state shareholders, the board of directors of SOE listed firms must now step up 
managerial disciplinary actions against value-destroying activities such as fraud. Consistent 
with theories of institutional change, corporate governance innovations could be triggered by 
mandating regulation across firms and by creating economic incentives. Therefore, the 
intersection of agency- and institutional change-related theories leads us to establish the second 
testable hypothesis: 
H2: Following the SSSR, there is an increase in the likelihood of CEO turnover 
following corporate fraud enforcement actions against SOE listed firms. 
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Since institutional inertia against corporate governance innovations most likely varies 
across firms, we would not expect the increase in managerial accountability for corporate fraud 
following SSSR to be uniform across all SOE listed firms. Although SSSR generates economic 
incentives for controlling state shareholders to address agency problems more effectively, it 
does not change the fact that SOE listed firms are propped up financially by the government 
and that politically connected managers are still likely to be appointed. Some firms may be 
more reliant on state financial assistance and/or more sensitive to political influence. In such 
firms, it may be less possible for the board of directors to step up the use of dismissal as tool to 
deter managerial wrongdoings, such as corporate fraud, that could reduce firm market value. 
However, institutional inertia can be difficult to capture empirically as it is affected by complex 
interactions between a wide range of factors relating to wealth distribution, resource ownership, 
and knowledge (Greif and Laitin, 2004). In the context of the SSSR, we argue that institutional 
inertia can be measured by the amount of consideration that restricted shareholders agree to 
pay tradable shareholders, and by the length of the negotiation period required to decide this 
amount. As explained earlier, the gradual elimination of trading restrictions does not 
commence until the negotiation process is completed, and an agreement is reached over the 
amount of consideration to be paid out. We expect that controlling state shareholders of 
Chinese SOE listed firms with less institutional inertia to governance improvements will be 
more willing to offer higher consideration to tradable shareholders, and will shorten the length 
of the negotiation period. Controlling state shareholders are expected to be willing to bear 
higher initial costs and accelerate the negotiation process only if they perceive higher personal 
economic benefits from trading shares afterward. Therefore, based on the intersection of 
agency- and institutional inertia-related theories, we formulate the following testable 
hypothesis: 
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H3: Following the SSSR in China, the increase in likelihood of CEO turnover 
following corporate fraud enforcement actions is more pronounced among SOE listed 
firms with less institutional inertia indicated by higher consideration payouts or 
shorter negotiation periods. 
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample description 
The data for regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud, firm ownership status, 
firm characteristics and performance, and firm corporate governance variables are obtained either 
from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER/Sinofin) or China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR). Over the ten-year sample period of 1999 to 2008, we identify 409 
fraud enforcement cases where valid data are available for all variables used in the analysis. These 
variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, return-on-asset, stock returns, special treatment 
status, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, proportion of restricted shares, CEO duality, 
board of directors activeness, supervisory board activeness, board of directors size, supervisory 
board size, and proportion of independent directors. Our data sample begins in 1999 because our 
control variables are lagged relative to the dependent variable, and among them the corporate 
governance variables used have only been available since 1998. For each firm that committed 
fraud, we identify a comparable firm that did not commit fraud by matching year, industry, and size 
following Jia et al. (2009).3 If there are multiple firms in the same year and industry that can be 
matched with the firm committing fraud, we select the one with closest size as matched firm. Thus 
our full sample contains 818 observations (i.e., 409 × 2). 
Table 1 presents the yearly (Panel A) and industry (Panel B) distributions of corporate 
fraudulent activities and the firms that committed them. In each panel, we report the number of 
fraud cases (Fraud Cases), the number of firms involved (Fraud Firms), the proportion of 
fraud-committing firms among all listed firms in the stock market (Fraud/Total Firms), the 
                                                 
3
 Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that matching is superior since does not impose a specific functional form on the 
relationship between the variable of interest and the control variables.  
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proportion of fraud-committing firms that are state-controlled (State/Fraud Firms), the proportion 
of fraud-committing state-controlled firms among all state-controlled listed firms in the stock 
market (Fraud/Total State Firms), and the proportion of state-controlled firms among all listed 
firms in the stock market (State/Total Firms). Panel A reveals that Fraud Cases and Fraud Firms 
increased substantially from 2001 onward.4 The State/Fraud Firm ratio peaks in 2002 even though 
the State/Total Firm ratio is highest in 1999. Thus, we control for year effects in our analysis. Panel 
B suggest that Materials and Consumer Discretionary are the two sectors with the highest Fraud 
Cases and Fraud Firms and the Telecommunication sector has the highest Fraud/Total State Firms 
ratio. We thus control for industry effects in our analysis. 
[ insert Table 1 here ] 
Hypotheses tests 
To test hypothesis H1, which predicts that the relation between CEO turnover and 
corporate fraud differs between SOE and non-SOE listed firms, we apply the logistic 
regression analyses based on Equation 1 below to our full sample: 
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(1)
 
The dependent variable CTO equals 1 if CEO turnover occurred in current year t and 0 
otherwise. All explanatory variables are lagged 1 year (i.e., t-1) to deal with possible causality 
issues. FRAUD equals 1 if the firm experienced regulatory enforcement actions against 
corporate fraud in the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. SOE equals 1 if the firm is state-controlled 
and 0 otherwise. MV is firm size measured as log market capitalization. PB is firm growth 
measured as price-to-book ratio. ROA is firm profitability measured as industry-adjusted 
                                                 
4
 Hou and Moore (2010) suggest that this increase is due to the enactment of a new regulation in 2001 entitled: 
Solution for Listed Firm Checks. The guidelines gave regulators greater authority and replaces selective checks 
with regular and special checks, and enhances that endows the regulatory commission.   
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return-on-asset. RET is stock market performance measured as annual stock return over the 
risk-free rate. ST equals 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment (i.e., those with two 
consecutive years of losses) and 0 otherwise. DIFF is ownership concentration measured by 
the difference in percentage shareholding between the largest and the second- and third-largest 
shareholders.
5
 FOWN is the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders. RESH is the 
ratio of restricted shares to total shares. DUAL equals 1 for firms with a CEO who also serves 
as board chairman and 0 otherwise.
6
 BDMEET and SBMEET are the activeness of board of 
directors and supervisory board, respectively, each measured by the number meetings held 
during the year. BDSIZE and SBSIZE are the size of the board of directors and supervisory 
board, respectively, each measured as the number of members. BIND is the degree of 
independence of the board of directors, measured as the ratio of independent directors to total 
directors. We also incorporate a set of dummy variables to control for fixed effects associated 
with sector (Industry) and time (Year). In this analysis, coefficient α1 indicates whether 
current-year CEO turnover is related to past-year regulatory enforcement action for corporate 
fraud among non-SOE listed firms. Coefficient α3 indicates whether this relationship is 
different between non-SOE and SOE listed firm groups. If coefficient α3 < 0, it suggests that 
CEO turnover to corporate fraud relationship is significantly lower among SOE listed firms 
relative to their non-SOE counterparts, consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H1. 
To test hypothesis H2, which predicts that the relationship between CEO turnover and 
corporate fraud increases among SOE listed firms after the SSSR, we apply the logistic 
regression analyses based on Equation 2 below in the SOE and non-SOE listed firm 
subsamples separately: 
                                                 
5
 We follow the approach of Gul et al. (2010). 
6
 We also have carried out analyses controlling for CEO-specific variables such as tenure and gender and our main 
inference remained unchanged. However, due to limitations in data availability of these variables in GTA CSMAR, 
including these CEO-specific variables results in a substantial reduction of sample size. 
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SSSR equals 1 for years after the firm has been selected to carry out the negotiation 
process and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined the same as in Equation 1. In this 
analysis, coefficient β1 indicates the relationship between current-year CEO turnover is related 
to past-year regulatory enforcement action against corporate fraud before the SSSR. 
Coefficient β3 indicates the incremental effect of the SSSR on this relationship. If β3 > 0 for the 
SOE listed firm subsample but not the non-SOE listed firm subsample, this suggests that the 
reform triggers increased CEO accountability for fraud among firms in which the elimination 
of restricted shares is likely to create the most economic incentives to improve governance. In 
other words, we have evidence that is consistent with hypothesis H2. 
To test hypothesis H3, which predicts that the increase in the relationship between CEO 
turnover and corporate fraud among SOE listed firms is greater among firms with less 
institutional inertia, we apply logistic regression analyses based on Equation 2 above in higher 
and lower institutional inertia SOE listed firms separately. Within the SOE subsample, we 
classify firms as higher (lower) institutional inertia groups if the reform consideration payout 
ratio agreed upon by restricted and tradable shareholders is below (above) median, or if the 
length of the  solicitation period of the reform negotiation process is longer (shorter) than the 
median. If coefficient β3 > 0 only among SOE listed firms with higher consideration payouts 
and shorter negotiation periods, this suggests that the increase in CEO accountability for fraud 
following SSSR mainly among such firms with less institutional inertia that would impede the 
perceived economic benefit of this reform to controlling state shareholders. This would 
indicate the existence of empirical evidence consistent with hypothesis H3. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
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Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. Panels A, B, 
and C report the full sample, fraud-committing firm subsample, and the matched firm 
subsample, respectively. Table 2 reveals that the fraud firms have significantly higher CEO 
turnover relative to comparable firms. This suggests that, on average, there is CEO 
accountability for corporate fraud in China. Fraud firms also have significantly higher growth, 
lower profitability, and are more likely to be in distress. This finding implies that weak 
performing and distressed firms that are overpriced by the market may experience greater 
pressure to commit corporate fraud. The likelihood that fraud firms are SOE listed firms is not 
significantly different from matched firms. This reduces the possibility that our subsequent 
empirical analysis could be biased in favor of finding a less pronounced relationship between 
CEO turnover and fraud among SOE listed firms. 
[ insert Table 2 here ] 
Table 3 presents the correlation analysis between our variables. CEO turnover exhibits a 
significantly positive relationship with corporate fraud and distress, and has a significantly 
negative relationship with firm size and profitability. This suggests that, on average, CEOs are 
held accountable for corporate fraud and poor performance. SOE listed firms tend to be larger, 
more profitable, and less distressed. One possible explanation is that SOE listed firms tend to 
receive financial support and business contracts from the government. However, such firms 
also have higher ownership concentration, more restricted shares, and a less independent board, 
indicating weaker governance mechanisms. Notice that the correlation between State and both 
Turnover and Fraud are statistically insignificant. This insignificance suggests that the 
likelihood of CEO turnover and corporate fraud are not necessarily higher among SOE listed 
firms than their non-SOE counterparts. In other words, these two groups of firms are on a level 
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playing field in terms of these two variables. Thus, our subsequent analysis of the relationship 
between CEO turnover and fraud is unlikely to be biased in favor of any particular group. 
[ insert Table 3 here ] 
Test of hypothesis H1 
Table 4 presents results from the test of hypothesis H1 using a logistic regression analysis 
based on Equation 1. We regress the indicator of current year CEO turnover on a lagged 
indicator of corporate fraud conditional on SOE indicator, and apply a wide range of control 
variables. In Regressions 1 to 3, the marginal effect of Fraud is consistently and significantly 
positive. This suggests a significant relation between CEO turnover and fraud among non-SOE 
listed firms. For instance, Regression 3, where all control variables are applied, suggests a 
20.90% (t-statistic = 3.76) increase in the probability of current year CEO turnover associated 
with past year corporate fraud among non-SOEs. However, the marginal effect of the 
interaction term Fraud×State is significantly negative throughout. For instance, it is –16.56% 
(t-statistic = –2.58) in Regression 3, when all control variables are applied. This indicates that 
CEOs of SOE listed firms are relatively less accountable to corporate fraud than their 
counterparts in non-SOE listed firms. The sum of the estimates for Fraud and Fraud×State is 
statistically insignificant, indicating that in SOE listed firms there is no relationship between 
current year turnover and lagged fraud. In other words, we observe empirical evidence that is 
consistent with hypothesis H1, which predicts that state control of listed firms moderates CEO 
turnover following corporate fraud regulatory enforcement actions. Our results are robust to 
controls for firm characteristics, performance, governance, and industry and year effects. 
[ insert Table 4 here ] 
Test of hypothesis H2 
Table 5 presents results from the test of hypothesis H2 using a logistic regression analysis 
based on Equation 2 separately for non-SOE (Panel A) and SOE (Panel B) listed firm 
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subsamples. We regress the indicator of current year CEO turnover on a lagged indicator of 
corporate fraud conditional on the SSSR indicator, and apply a wide range of control variables. 
The marginal effect of Fraud, which indicates the relation between current turnover and lagged 
fraud prior to the reform, is positive and statistically significant only among non-SOE listed 
firms (e.g., 27.02% with t-statistic = 3.54 in Panel A of Regression 2) and not the SOE listed 
firms in Panel B (e.g., –2.20% with t-statistic = –0.46 in Panel B of Regression 2). Thus, prior 
to the SSSR, CEOs were more likely to retain their job after committing fraud if they worked 
for SOE listed firms. The marginal effect of the interaction term Fraud×SSSR, which indicates 
the incremental relation between current turnover and lagged fraud following the reform, is 
positive and statistically significantly only for SOE listed firms (e.g., 29.40% with t-statistic = 
1.78 in Panel B of Regression 2) and not non-SOE listed firms (e.g., –4.01% with t-statistic = 
–0.33 in Panel A of Regression 2). This indicates a significant increase in the accountability of 
CEOs for corporate fraud among SOE listed firms after SSSR, consistent with hypothesis H3. 
The fact that the interaction term Fraud×SSSR is significantly positive only in SOE listed firms 
but not among non-SOE listed firms also strengthens our inference that this effect is attributed 
to the SSSR because restricted shares are more prevalent in SOEs. 
[ insert Table 5 here ] 
Test of hypothesis H3 
Table 6 presents results from the test of hypothesis H3 using a logistic regression analysis 
based on Equation 2 separately for high and low institutional inertia SOE listed firms. We 
regress the indicator of current year CEO turnover on a lagged indicator of corporate fraud 
conditional on SSSR indicator, and apply a wide array of control variables. In Panel A, we 
define firms with higher (lower) institutional inertia as those with below (above) median 
reform consideration payout. In Panel B, we define firms with higher (lower) institutional 
inertia as those with longer (shorter) than median solicitation period for the reform negotiation 
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process.
7
 Throughout Table 6, the marginal effect pertaining to Fraud is statistically 
insignificant. In other words, there is no accountability of CEO for fraud in SOE listed firms 
prior to the reform in both high and low institutional inertia groups identified using either 
proxy. In both Panels A and B, the marginal effect of the interaction term Fraud×SSSR is 
positive and statistically significantly only for the lower institutional inertia firms and not the 
higher institutional inertia firms. For instance, in Panel A this interaction term is 24.81% 
(t-statistic = 2.32) in the higher payout group but only 14.02% (t-statistic = 0.66) in the lower 
payout group. In Panel B this interaction term is 46.53% (t-statistic = 2.39) in the shorter 
negotiation period group but only 30.20% (t-statistic = 1.03) in the longer negotiation period 
group. This suggests that the increased CEO accountability for fraud among SOE listed firms 
that we observe in Table 5 is mainly concentrated among those with controlling state 
shareholders that are willing to pay more consideration and speed up the negotiation process, 
which we assume to have less institutional inertia against governance changes after the reform. 
In other words, we have evidence that is consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H3. The 
observation that two variables specifically associated with the implementation of the reform 
have a significant effect in determining the increase in CEO turnover after fraud further 
strengthens our inference that this effect is brought about by the SSSR. 
[ insert Table 6 ] 
Additional tests 
Although we expect CEOs of state-controlled Chinese listed firms to be less accountable 
to their fraudulent behavior, it may be difficult for state controlling shareholders to justify more 
serious cases such as those that invoke public outrage and severe regulatory enforcement 
actions. To reduce damages to the firms’ reputation and political capital, even state-controlled 
listed firms are likely to distant itself from CEOs under such circumstances. Defending CEOs 
                                                 
7
 In the SOE listed firms sub-sample used to test hypothesis H3, the median consideration payout ratio is 19.13% 
of restricted shares, and the median solicitation period for the reform negotiation process is 10 days. 
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that deliberately seek to mislead the public or are judged by regulatory authority to require 
severe prosecution are more likely to provoke adverse public opinion against the firm. To 
perform the tests, we partition our sample by fraud type into those that deliberately seek to 
mislead investors through information disclosure misconduct (as more serious frauds) and 
other types of fraud (as less serious frauds), and again partition the full sample by regulatory 
enforcement type into those that involves actual material penalty (as more serious enforcement 
actions) and those that only invoke verbal warning (as less serious enforcement actions).  The 
untabulated results show that the marginal effect of Fraud×State is economically and 
statistically significantly negative only among less serious corporate frauds or regulatory 
enforcement cases. It shows that the lack of CEO accountability to corporate fraud in 
state-controlled Chinese listed firms is indeed mainly concentrated in minor fraud cases and 
light penalty that are less likely to provoke adverse public opinion.  
Finally, as China is a vast country with unequal regional development, it would also be 
interesting to explore whether regional development disparity associated with variations in 
investor protection and market pressures affects CEO accountability
8
. To perform our analysis, 
we partition the sample based on the regional dummies constructed in Firth et al. (2006a). 
Developed regions are defined as Shanghai, Shenzhen as well as the open cities and provinces 
along the coast; while less developed regions are the inland provinces. Untabulated results 
show that the marginal effect of Fraud×State is economically and statistically significantly 
negative only among firms located in less developed regions. It shows that institutional 
development helps to improve the CEO accountability to corporate fraud in state-controlled 
firms.  
 
                                                 
8
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The SSSR is essentially a “natural experiment" that enables us to examine how changes 
in the economic incentives of controlling shareholders influence managerial accountability for 
corporate fraud. From corporate scandals to financial crises, the experiences in developed 
countries over the past decade have demonstrated the importance of corporate transparency 
and investor confidence in the efficient allocation of financial resources in the capital market, 
which in turn affects the wider economy. Therefore, the strengthening of corporate governance 
and managerial accountability is essential to the economic aspirations of China as well as other 
developing countries. Our empirical study of the relationship between CEO turnover and 
corporate fraud among Chinese listed firm reveals three main findings, which we contextualize 
and explain by drawing on agency- and institutional-related theories. First, there is less CEO 
accountability for corporate fraud among SOE listed firms relative to their non-SOE 
counterparts. Second, there is an increase in CEO turnover following fraud among SOE listed 
firms after the institution of SSSR. Third, we show that after SSSR, the increase in CEO 
accountability for fraud among SOE listed firms is more pronounced among firms that are 
more willing to implement the reform process. 
Our first finding implies that state control of listed firms in China impedes the efficacy of 
governance mechanisms to address agency costs. The existing corporate governance literature 
suggests that ownership concentration exerts two counteracting effects. One is the incentive 
alignment effect (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), when the interests and wealth of large 
shareholders are associated with the value of the firm that they control. Another is the 
entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002), when large shareholders collude with the 
management to expropriate minority outside investors. Unlike evidence from developed 
Western economies, existing studies of China often suggest that ownership concentration by 
state shareholders leads to an entrenchment effect that impedes corporate governance from the 
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point of view of minority equity investors (Fan et al., 2007; Tihanyi and Hegarty, 2007).
9
 For 
instance, empirical studies provide evidence that Chinese SOE listed firms are more likely to 
collude with auditors (Wang et al., 2008), have less corporate transparency (Gul et al., 2010), 
less financial reporting conservatism (Chen et al., 2010). However, performance improves after 
controls are transferred from state to private shareholders (Chen et al., 2008). Unlike previous 
studies in China, we examine managerial accountability for corporate fraud, and argue that we 
provide more direct evidence consistent with an entrenchment effect in SOE listed firms. 
Our second and third findings imply that the SSSR reduces the moderating effect of state 
control on the efficacy of governance mechanism in Chinese listed firms. Empirical studies of 
the economic consequences of the SSSR in other contexts have also drawn broadly similar 
conclusions. Chen et al. (2012) document a decrease in the average cash holdings by Chinese 
listed firms after the reform, especially among firms with weaker corporate governance. They 
interpret this as evidence of increased incentive alignment between controlling and minority 
shareholders, since corporate finance literature (e.g., Jensen, 1986) suggests that excess cash 
holdings indicates misaligned incentives between corporate insiders and outsiders. Hou et al. 
(2012) document an increase in stock price informativeness among Chinese SOE listed firms 
following the reform. This evidence is consistent with a reduction in information asymmetry as 
corporate governance improves, since previous studies (e.g., Morck et al., 2000; Gul et al., 
2010) attribute low stock price informativeness in China to weak investor protection. Hou and 
Lee (2012) show a decrease in foreign share discount among Chinese SOE listed firms 
following the reform. This finding is also consistent with reduced agency problems under state 
control, as existing studies (e.g., Leuz et al., 2009) suggest that information disadvantage 
renders foreign investors more concerned about insider expropriation than domestic investors. 
                                                 
9
 Studies of Western developed economies often associate large shareholders with the incentive alignment effect 
and better monitoring of executives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). For instance, 
empirical studies reveal that large shareholders are associated with increased managerial turnover (Kaplan and 
Minton, 1994) and tighter control over executive compensation (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). 
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However, these previous studies of SSSR draw inference of governance improvements 
indirectly from changes in firm characteristics. We argue that managerial accountability 
provides a more direct setting to evaluate changes in corporate governance, and we also infer 
that SSSR contributes to the reduction of agency problems.  
Our study contributes the corporate governance literature in three ways. First, we provide 
evidence that governance can be affected by the incentives of the principal, while existing 
studies in this literature largely focus on the incentives of the agent. Second, we provide 
evidence through a natural experiment setting that cross-sectional variations in the 
consequences of corporate fraud can be influenced exogenously by regulatory reforms. Third, 
we provide further evidence suggesting that state ownership could impede corporate 
governance by reducing managerial accountability. Our evidence also contributes to the 
literature on emerging market development in three ways. First, for emerging economies where 
ownership concentrations can be high, we show that strengthening the incentive alignment 
between controlling and minority shareholders could be beneficial. Second, as SOEs are 
relatively more common in emerging than developed economies, we show that such firms can 
respond positively to regulatory reforms. Third, in the particular context of China’s further 
transition to market-oriented economy, we provide further empirical evidence that the SSSR 
yields positive outcome.  
Our analysis carries two caveats. First, despite the end of trading restrictions, there could 
be government pressure to discourage state shareholders from trading their stock, which in turn 
limits any increase in their incentives to monitor and ensure managers maximize firms’ market 
value. However, this argument neglects an established Chinese government policy known as 
Zhua Da Fang Xiao, which seeks to sustain state ownership only in strategic enterprises (for 
example, energy, transportation, aerospace, defense, etc.) and to reduce state control over less 
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essential businesses.
10
 Anecdotal evidence from the media also confirm that previously 
restricted shares held by state shareholders have been actively traded in the stock market 
following this reform.
11
 Second, no incentive alignment effect is possible until all restricted 
shares of a firm have become fully tradable (36 months after the ratification of the firm’s 
compensation plan). Based on this argument, the systematic effect of the SSSR across all firms 
in the Chinese stock market can only be examined after 2011. However, this argument assumes 
that restricted shareholders are myopic and do not seek to weed out opportunistic managers 
until the trading restriction on all shares is lifted. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, restricted 
shareholders can sell at least a portion of their holdings within the 36 months following 
ratification of the compensation plan, depending on the proportion of ownership. Thus, this 
argument also ignores the wealth implication of a rising share price for the restricted 
shareholders over this transition period. 
The evidence from our study does not necessarily deny the value of the political 
connections of managers and controlling shareholders in a transitional economy, but rather 
implies the need for better corporate governance mechanisms to reduce the potential negative 
effects of such connections. Some studies suggest that political connection is a managerial 
resource beneficial to Chinese firms. For instance, Xin and Pearce (1996) argue that political 
connections are a substitute for insufficient institutional infrastructure, Lou (2003) suggests 
they provide flexible resource allocation in a factor mobility constrained environment, and 
Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002) argue that they facilitate business in an uncertain environment. 
There is also evidence that political connection influences market benefit (Davies et al., 1995), 
                                                 
10
 For instance, this policy has been laid out in the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development and the Outline for the Long-Range Objective Through the Year 2010. 
11
 We list a few recent financial news articles here by translating their Chinese language headlines into English 
language and provide their web link for reference: “29 firms this year experienced local government stock 
ownership reduction” http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/zqyw/20110827/4474686.shtml, “Selling shares – July wave 
of government stock ownership reduction wave” http://stock.hexun.com/2011-07-29/131890710.html, “Local 
government July stock ownership reduction in 25 listed firms to cash in 3.3 billion RMB” 
http://www.beelink.com/20110808/2808514.shtml 
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competitive advantages (Tsang, 1998), and improves firm performance (Nee, 1992; Peng and 
Luo, 2000). Our study also confirms the benefit of on-going reform of Chinese SOEs. Existing 
studies in China have revealed a sustained reform process that seeks to evolve and adapt SOEs 
toward market (Ralston et al., 2006). For instance, at the early stage of this evolvement, 
bonuses to reward performance have been reintroduced to motivate employees (Chen, 1995), 
and short-term renewable contracts have replaced life-long positions (Tenev et al., 2002). 
Subsequently, the government has also introduced regulations to punish business failures 
(Steinfeld, 1998) and has deregulated some protected sectors (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002). 
Finally, and more generally, our results highlight the importance of an evolving role for 
understanding the interplay between legal institutions, finance, management, and governance 
in emerging markets that is sensitive to the time series changes in regulatory reforms and 
evolving institutional structures, as highlighted by Allen et al. (2005), and not static 
comparisons at a particular point in time. 
Future research could also examine whether the SSSR affects other aspects of corporate 
behavior after fraud.
12
 For example, to restore investor confidence after committing fraud, are 
SOEs more likely to dismiss auditors in the post-reform period? Furthermore, would investors 
find reported earnings more informative in the post-reform period among firms that replace the 
CEO or auditors after fraud detection?  
                                                 
12
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these interesting ideas. 
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Table 1. Sample description 
 Fraud Cases Fraud Firms 
Fraud/ Total 
Firms (%) 
SOE/Fraud 
 Firms (%) 
Fraud/Total 
SOE (%) 
SOE/Total 
Firms (%) 
Panel A: Year distribution 
1999 13 13 1.43 53.85 0.91 84.30 
2000 17 17 1.62 64.71 1.27 82.92 
2001 73 67 5.96 73.13 5.30 82.22 
2002 60 50 4.19 80.00 4.31 77.87 
2003 56 45 3.58 68.89 3.36 73.43 
2004 70 60 4.44 55.00 3.53 69.08 
2005 100 69 5.11 49.28 3.64 69.13 
2006 97 71 5.04 45.07 3.49 64.96 
2007 79 61 4.00 44.26 2.93 60.35 
2008 39 35 2.19 51.43 1.89 59.66 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
Energy 17 14 4.13 50.00 2.47 83.48 
Materials 100 81 3.24 64.20 2.65 78.48 
Industrials 88 72 2.79 56.94 2.19 72.56 
Consumer Discretionary 113 94 3.51 69.15 3.48 69.70 
Consumer Staples 76 61 6.41 63.93 5.60 73.29 
Health Care 41 32 3.62 40.63 2.47 59.50 
Financials 45 38 3.77 55.26 3.65 57.09 
Information Technology 87 66 5.47 45.45 4.00 62.14 
Telecommunication  7 4 16.00 50.00 11.11 72.00 
Utilities 20 16 2.88 75.00 2.40 90.11 
Others 10 10 51.82 0.00 0.00 50.00 
This table presents the yearly (Panel A) and industry (Panel B) distribution of our corporate fraud sample. Our sample period is 1999 to 2008. Fraud Cases is the number of 
disclosed cases of fraud committed by listed firms. Fraud Firms is the number of listed firms that committed fraud. Fraud/Total Firms is the ratio of the number of cases of fraud 
committed by listed firms to total number of listed firms in the stock market. State/Fraud Firms is the proportion of fraud-committing listed firms that are state controlled. 
Fraud/Total State Firms is the proportion of fraud-committing state-controlled listed firms relative to the total number of state-controlled listed firms in the stock market. 
State/Total Firms is the proportion of all listed firms in the stock market that are state controlled. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
  Panel A: Whole sample Panel B: Fraud firms Panel C: Matched firms Panels C – B 
mean difference   Median Mean Std dev Median Mean Std dev Median Mean Std dev 
CTO 0 0.300 0.458 0 0.364 0.482 0 0.235 0.424 -0.130 
*** 
SOE 1 0.619 0.486 1 0.601 0.490 1 0.636 0.482 0.034 
 
SSSR 0 0.267 0.442 0 0.222 0.416 0 0.311 0.463 0.088 
*** 
MV 20.104 20.124 0.947 20.124 20.145 0.938 20.072 20.103 0.956 -0.042 
 
PB 3.191 4.557 5.445 3.362 4.936 5.884 2.922 4.178 4.946 -0.758 
** 
ROA -0.003 -0.013 0.030 -0.006 -0.019 0.032 -0.001 -0.007 0.028 0.011 
*** 
RET -0.112 -0.010 1.041 -0.147 -0.022 0.860 -0.077 0.001 1.195 0.023 
 
ST 0 0.257 0.437 0 0.325 0.469 0 0.188 0.391 -0.137 
*** 
DIFF 17.765 23.007 22.910 14.260 20.998 22.402 19.190 25.016 23.262 4.017 
** 
FOWN 0 0.010 0.058 0 0.008 0.047 0 0.013 0.067 0.005 
 
RESH 0.584 0.550 0.141 0.576 0.547 0.143 0.587 0.553 0.139 0.006 
 
DUAL 0 0.075 0.263 0 0.073 0.261 0 0.076 0.265 0.002 
 
BDMEET 8 8.271 3.194 8 8.878 3.382 7 7.665 2.873 -1.213 
*** 
SBMEET 4 3.842 1.664 4 3.939 1.697 4 3.746 1.627 -0.193 
* 
BDSIZE 6 6.806 2.243 6 6.824 2.226 6 6.787 2.262 -0.037 
 
SBSIZE 1 1.152 0.751 1 1.159 0.765 1 1.144 0.738 -0.015 
 
BDIND 0.5 0.443 0.243 0.5 0.448 0.246 0.5 0.439 0.239 -0.009 
 
Obs.   818    409    409    
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This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. CTO equals 1 if CEO turnover occurred in current year t and 0 otherwise. SOE 
equals 1 if the firm is state-controlled and 0 otherwise. SSSR equals 1 for years after the firm has been selected to carry out the negotiation process and 0 otherwise. 
MV is firm size measured as log market capitalization. PB is firm growth measured as price-to-book ratio. ROA is firm profitability measured as industry-adjusted 
return-on-asset. RET is stock market performance measured as annual stock return over the risk-free rate. ST equals 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment 
(i.e., those with two consecutive years of losses) and 0 otherwise. DIFF is ownership concentration measured by the difference in percentage shareholding 
between the largest and the second- and third-largest shareholders. FOWN is the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders. RESH is the ratio of restricted 
shares to total shares. DUAL equals 1 for firms with a CEO who also serves as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BDMEET and SBMEET are the activeness of board 
of directors and supervisory board, respectively, each measured by the number meetings held during the year. BDSIZE and SBSIZE are the size of the board of 
directors and supervisory board, respectively, each measured as the number of members. BIND is the degree of independence of the board of directors, measured 
as the ratio of independent directors to total directors. Panels A, B, and C report the whole sample, fraud firms sample, and matched firm sample (i.e., non-fraud 
committing firms), respectively. Our sample period is 1999 to 2008.  
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Correlation analysis 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 CTO 1          
2 FRAUD 0.14* 1         
3 SOE -0.04 -0.04 1        
4 SSSR -0.09 -0.10* -0.20* 1       
5 MV -0.11* 0.02 0.12* 0.28* 1      
6 PB 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.14* 0.27* 1     
7 ROA -0.16* -0.19* 0.15* 0.12* 0.32* -0.05 1    
8 RET 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.25* 0.38* 0.26* 0.18* 1   
9 ST 0.09* 0.16* -0.14* -0.08 -0.26* 0.12* -0.15* -0.02 1  
10 DIFF -0.11* -0.09 0.38* -0.05 0.16* -0.05 0.17* 0.07 -0.08 1 
11 FOWN -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.10* 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
12 RESH 0.02 -0.02 0.14* -0.44* -0.30* 0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.22* 
13 DUAL 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
14 BDMEET 0.03 0.19* -0.07 0.17* 0.08 0.09 -0.05 0.06 0.08 -0.07 
15 SBMEET -0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.16* 0.15* 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.01 
16 BDSIZE -0.01 0.01 0.21* -0.18* 0.22* 0.12* 0.03 0.03 -0.16* 0.02 
17 SBSIZE -0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 
18 BDIND -0.06 0.02 -0.24* 0.35* -0.20* -0.15* -0.07 -0.02 0.17* -0.11* 
            
  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18   
11 FOWN 1          
12 RESH 0.05 1         
13 DUAL -0.01 -0.04 1        
14 BDMEET 0.05 -0.12* 0.02 1       
15 SBMEET 0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.37* 1      
16 BDSIZE -0.03 0.15* -0.05 -0.16* -0.13* 1     
17 SBSIZE -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.06 1    
18 BDIND 0.01 -0.25* 0.03 0.28* 0.15* -0.69* 0.00 1   
            
This table presents the correlation analysis of the variables used in our analyses. FRAUD equals 1 if the firm 
experienced regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Table 2. Our sample includes 818 firm-year observations and covers the period from 1999 
to 2008. 
*
 indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4. CEO turnover following fraud conditional on state control (tests H1) 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
FRAUD 0.2292 (4.33) 
***  0.2135 (3.83) 
***  0.2090 (3.76) 
***  
SOE 0.0612 (1.20) 
  0.1086 (1.95) 
*  0.0983 (1.80) 
*  
FRAUD×SOE -0.1554 (-2.48) 
**  -0.1650 (-2.58) 
**  -0.1656 (-2.58) 
**  
MV   
  -0.0579 (-2.48) 
**  -0.0430 (-1.77) 
*  
PB   
  0.0002 (0.05) 
  0.0003 (0.09) 
  
ROA   
  -1.5599 (-2.77) 
***  -1.8246 (-3.08) 
***  
RET   
  0.0384 (2.39) 
**  0.0418 (2.77) 
***  
ST   
  0.0464 (1.18) 
  0.0594 (1.47) 
  
DIFF   
  -0.0018 (-2.21) 
**  -0.0019 (-2.31) 
**  
FOWN   
  -0.0550 (-0.19) 
  -0.1105 (-0.40) 
  
RESH   
  -0.0154 (-0.11) 
  0.0199 (0.14) 
  
DUAL   
  0.0328 (0.53) 
  0.0110 (0.17) 
  
BDMEET   
  0.0066 (1.25) 
  0.0062 (1.14) 
  
SBMEET   
  -0.0033 (-0.29) 
  -0.0029 (-0.25) 
  
BDSIZE   
  -0.0205 (-1.97) 
**  -0.0194 (-1.82) 
*  
SBSIZE   
  -0.0535 (-2.02) 
**  -0.0532 (-2.01) 
**  
BDIND   
  -0.3703 (-3.71) 
***  -0.3425 (-3.29) 
***  
Industry effect No  
 
 No  
  
 Yes  
  
 
Year effect No  
  No  
  Yes  
   
Pseudo R
2
 0.0239 
 
  0.0719  
   0.0872 
 
  
Obs. 818 
 
  818  
 
 818 
  
   
   
          
This table presents the logistic regression analysis of the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate fraud enforcement actions 
conditional on state control for the full sample period, as well as pre- and post-Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) periods. Our sample period 
is 1999 to 2008. All variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Marginal effects are reported. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. The t-statistics in brackets are tests of differences between pre- and post-SSSR subsamples. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. CEO turnover after fraud conditional on SSSR separately in non-SOE and SOE listed firms (test of H2) 
 Panel A: Non-SOE listed firms Panel B: SOE listed firms 
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 1  Regression 2 
FRAUD 0.2569 (3.45) 
***  0.2702 (3.54) 
***  -0.0220 (-0.49) 
  -0.0220 (-0.46) 
 
SSSR 0.6164 (2.30) 
**  0.5982 (2.11) 
**  -0.1031 (-0.51) 
  -0.1486 (-0.78) 
 
FRAUD×SSSR -0.0235 (-0.20) 
  -0.0401 (-0.33) 
  0.3356 (2.09) 
**  0.2940 (1.78) 
* 
MV -0.0751 (-1.72) 
*  -0.0930 (-1.86) 
*  -0.0646 (-2.14) 
**  -0.0282 (-0.82) 
 
PB -0.0026 (-0.54) 
  -0.0031 (-0.61) 
  0.0022 (0.48) 
  0.0023 (0.46) 
 
ROA 0.0164 (0.02) 
  0.4549 (0.51) 
  -3.6338 (-4.42) 
***  -3.7638 (-4.14) 
*** 
RET 0.0188 (1.06) 
  0.0163 (0.90) 
  0.1119 (3.05) 
***  0.0984 (2.43) 
** 
ST 0.0514 (0.83) 
  0.0491 (0.78) 
  0.0289 (0.52) 
  0.0417 (0.73) 
 
DIFF 0.0000 (-0.02) 
  -0.0002 (-0.07) 
  -0.0015 (-1.55) 
  -0.0016 (-1.52) 
 
FOWN 0.5218 (1.08) 
  0.6474 (1.21) 
  -0.8585 (-0.95) 
  -1.0707 (-0.98) 
 
RESH 0.7267 (1.97) 
**  0.6673 (1.78) 
*  -0.0329 (-0.17) 
  -0.0794 (-0.39) 
 
RESH×SSSR -1.1178 (-2.46) 
**  -1.1971 (-2.43) 
**  -0.3153 (-0.69) 
  -0.2641 (-0.58) 
 
DUAL 0.0636 (0.65) 
  0.1237 (1.18) 
  -0.0290 (-0.33) 
  -0.0497 (-0.55) 
 
BDMEET 0.0084 (0.84) 
  0.0080 (0.75) 
  0.0092 (1.33) 
  0.0121 (1.66) 
 
SBMEET 0.0097 (0.55) 
  0.0140 (0.75) 
  -0.0099 (-0.70) 
  -0.0115 (-0.77) 
 
BDSIZE -0.0095 (-0.51) 
  -0.0086 (-0.43) 
  -0.0191 (-1.57) 
  -0.0249 (-1.76) 
* 
SBSIZE -0.0958 (-2.39) 
**  -0.1134 (-2.64) 
*  -0.0042 (-0.12) 
  -0.0054 (-0.16) 
 
BDIND -0.2132 (-1.14) 
  -0.2018 (-0.94) 
  -0.3567 (-2.69) 
***  -0.3935 (-2.62) 
*** 
Industry effect No  
 
 Yes  
  No  
 
 Yes  
 
Year effect No  
 
 Yes  
  No  
 
 Yes  
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.117    0.1449 
 
  0.1163  
 
 0.1457 
 
 
Obs. 312    312 
 
  506  
 
 506 
 
 
This table presents the logistic regression analysis of the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate fraud enforcement actions conditional on the Split Share Structure 
Reform (SSSR). Panel A (B) is based on non-SOE (SOE) listed firms. Our sample period is 1999 to 2008. All variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Marginal effects are 
reported. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The t-statistics in brackets are tests of differences between non-SOE and SOE subsamples. 
***
, 
**
, 
and 
*
 denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. CEO turnover after fraud conditional on SSSR separately in low and high institutional inertia SOE listed firms (test of H3) 
 Panel A: Reform consideration payout ratio Panel B: Solicitation period of reform negotiation process 
  
Higher inertia 
(Lower payout) 
 Lower inertia 
(Higher payout) 
 Higher inertia 
(Longer period) 
 Lower inertia 
(Shorter period) 
FRAUD -0.0749 (-0.83) 
  0.0087 (0.55) 
  0.1030 (1.21) 
  -0.0930 (-1.41) 
 
SSSR -0.3717 (-0.79) 
  -0.0042 (-0.07) 
  0.1147 (0.24) 
  -0.2866 (-1.37) 
 
FRAUD×SSSR 0.1402 (0.66) 
  0.2481 (2.32) 
**  0.3020 (1.03) 
  0.4653 (2.39) 
** 
MV -0.0805 (-1.12) 
  -0.0015 (-0.14) 
  0.0372 (0.51) 
  -0.0402 (-0.74) 
 
PB -0.0083 (-0.67) 
  0.0014 (0.84) 
  -0.0011 (-0.10) 
  0.0050 (0.68) 
 
ROA -4.2866 (-2.72) 
***  -0.9571 (-2.90) 
***  -9.0761 (-5.04) 
***  -0.2637 (-0.18) 
 
RET 0.0983 (0.93) 
  0.0255 (1.73) 
*  0.2914 (2.08) 
**  0.0182 (0.39) 
 
ST 0.3350 (2.36) 
**  -0.0373 (-2.39) 
**  -0.0785 (-0.84) 
  0.1044 (1.12) 
 
DIFF -0.0008 (-0.43) 
  -0.0006 (-1.57) 
  -0.0049 (-2.56) 
**  -0.0006 (-0.38) 
 
FOWN -0.2671 (-0.43) 
  -14.0193 (-0.33) 
  -8.3028 (-2.11) 
**  -0.5439 (-0.76) 
 
RESH -1.2341 (-2.17) 
**  0.0537 (0.78) 
  0.6922 (1.85) 
*  -0.5070 (-1.48) 
 
RESH×SSSR 0.5524 (0.42) 
  -0.2172 (-1.48) 
  -0.7035 (-0.96) 
  0.1399 (0.24) 
 
DUAL -0.0325 (-0.15) 
  -0.0128 (-0.59) 
  -0.0928 (-0.70) 
  0.0056 (0.04) 
 
BDMEET 0.0150 (1.16) 
  0.0037 (1.27) 
  0.0117 (0.86) 
  0.0075 (0.75) 
 
SBMEET 0.0094 (0.41) 
  -0.0089 (-1.49) 
  -0.0544 (-1.87) 
*  -0.0081 (-0.42) 
 
BDSIZE 0.0089 (0.33) 
  -0.0077 (-1.65) 
*  -0.0302 (-1.34) 
  -0.0275 (-1.30) 
 
SBSIZE -0.0696 (-1.11) 
  0.0028 (0.26) 
  -0.0268 (-0.41) 
  -0.0126 (-0.25) 
 
BDIND -0.3060 (-1.10) 
  -0.0998 (-1.89) 
*  -0.6326 (-2.36) 
**  -0.3616 (-1.87) 
* 
Industry effect Yes  
  Yes  
  Yes  
  Yes  
 
Year effect Yes  
  Yes  
  Yes  
  Yes  
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2671  
  0.1985  
  0.3186  
  0.1334 
 
 
Obs. 182 
   324 
 
  240 
   266 
 
 
This table presents the logistic regression analysis of the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate fraud enforcement actions conditional on the Split Share Structure 
Reform (SSSR) within SOE listed firms. Panel A classifies firms with higher (lower) inertia as those with below (above) median level of reform consideration payout ratios. 
Panel B classifies firms with higher (lower) inertia as those with longer (shorter) than median solicitation period for reform negotiation process. Our sample period is 1999 to 
2008. All variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Marginal effects are reported. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The t-statistics in brackets 
are tests of differences between high and low consideration payout subsamples. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
